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LABOR LAW-FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT-RECOVERY IN SUIT BY SECRETARY
OF LABOR OF WAGES LosT THROUGH WRONGFUL DISCHARGE-Several employees of respondent had requested the Secretary of Labor to institute an
action against the respondent under the Fair Labor Standards Act1 to
recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation. As a result,
the employees were discharged, in violation of section 15 (a) (3) of the act.2
The Secretary brought an action under section 173 to enjoin respondents
from the violation, for reinstatement and for wages lost due to the wrongful
discharge. The court of appeals4 held that the district court had no jurisdiction under section 17 to award wages lost through wrongful discharge. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed, three justices
dissenting.11 The proviso in section 17 of the FLSA depriving the district
courts of jurisdiction to award unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation in a suit by the Secretary of Labor to restrain violations of the
act does not apply to wages lost by wrongful discharge. Mitchell v. Robert
DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 80 S. Ct. 332 (1960).
The Fair Labor Standards Act prohibits the discharge of an employee
because he has taken action seeking enforcement of the minimum wage and

152 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U .S.C. (1958) §201 et seq.
52 Stat. 1068 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §215 (a)(3), making it unlawful for any employer within the scope of the act to "discharge ••• any employee because such employee
has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or
related to this Act.••."
s 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), as amended, 63 Stat. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §217, granting
district courts jurisdiction to restrain violations of §15, including §15 (a) (3), note 2 supra.
4 (5th Cir. 1958) 260 F. (2d) 929.
Ii Justices Whittaker, Black, and Clark, dissenting.
2
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overtime compensation provisions of the act. 6 To implement the enforcement of this prohibition, the statute provides criminal sanctions7 and, in
section 17,8 empowers the Secretary of Labor to enjoin its violation. No provision is made for the recovery of wages lost through wrongful discharge.
Under the original act, however, in a section 17 injunction suit by the
Administrator of the Wages and Hours Division,9 it was held in Walling v.
O'Grady 1 0 that district courts had jurisdiction to award wages lost due to
wrongful discharge, and in McComb v. Scerbo11 that unpaid minimum
wages and overtime compensation could be awarded. In 1949, due to the
hesitancy of workers to bring suit under the act il'l their own right for fear
of resulting discriminatory action by employers, Congress added section
16 (c) 12 authorizing the administrator, at the written request of an employee,
to bring suit for deficiencies in minimum wages and overtime compensation
required under sections 6'13 and 714 of the act. In view of the remedy provided by section 16 (c), a proviso was added to section 17 to deprive district
courts of jurisdiction "in any action brought by the Secretary of Labor to
restrain . . . violations [of the act], to order the payment to employees of
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation. . . .''15 This
proviso was to "have the effect of reversing such decisions as McComb v.
Scerbo.''16 The principal case held that the O'Grady case, allowing recovery of wages lost through wrongful discharge in a section 17 suit, was not
such a decision as McComb v. Scerbo, within the meaning of the proviso.
The soundness of this decision seems to be assured by a comparison of the
facts in each case in relation to the respective remedies available under the
act. The Scerbo case, wherein an injunction was sought by the Secretary
against violations of the minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions of the act, involved just such a situation as section 16 (c) was designed
to remedy. Back minimum wages may also be recovered in an action by the
employee in his own right.17 Thus allowing recovery of deficiencies in minimum wages and overtime compensation in an injunction suit by the Secretary would lead to a superfluity of remedies for that particular violation.
But in the case of a wrongful discharge, such as in Walling v. O'Grady and
See note 2 supra.
16 (a), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (a), provides for a fine or not
more than $10,000, for the first willful violation of §15, and the same fine, imprisonment
for not more than six months, or both, for subsequent willful violations.
s See note 3 supra.
9 Under the Reorganization Plan of 1950, Congress transferred the exclusive power to
bring injunctions under §17 of the FLSA to the Secretary of Labor.
10 (2d Cir. 1944) 146 F. (2d) 422.
11 (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 137.
12 63 Stat. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (c).
1352 Stat. 1062 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §206.
14 52 Stat. 1063 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §207.
15 See note 3 supra.
16 H. R. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 32 (1949).
17 Section 16 (b), 52 Stat. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. (1958) §216 (b).
6
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the principal case, the act fails expressly to provide any remedy. Nor can
the discharged employee maintain a civil action for the lost wages.is
Public interest in enforcing the FLSA dictates that employees within the
scope of the act be enabled to recover wages lost through such retaliatory
action by the employer. The danger of discharge and a resulting loss of income for an indefinite period is often more than enough to deter an underpaid employee from taking action to recover deficiencies in past wages.
Since enforcement of the act is largely dependent upon the action of employees and upon information supplied by them,19 the inaction which
would result from failure to restore discharged employees to the status quo
could render the FLSA a virtual nullity. The injunction suit by the Secretary under section l 7 seems the most reasonable vehicle for accomplishing
the recovery. And the introduction of a case involving public policy invokes full utilization of the traditionally broad and flexible character of an
equity court's remedial powers.20 Since the enforcement of a statute is
not limited to the remedies expressly provided therein,21 the scope of an
equity court's jurisdiction in providing for such enforcement will be limited
only by a clear expression of legislative intent. 22 A district court may
order payment of wages lost by an employee after his wrongful discharge
has been enjoined.23 It is difficult to see why a judicial command should
be more favorably enforced than that of a legislature, both being in furtherance of the same policy. Failure of the employee to cause the institution of
an immediate injunction would not seem to justify depriving him of a
remedy for wages lost during the delay.24

Robert Brooks
18 Since the FI.SA makes no provision for a civil action by an employee to recover
damages for discharge in violation of the act, redress for such action is by criminal pro•
ceedings as provided by the act. Powell v. Washington Post Co., (D.C. Cir. 1959) 267 F.
(2d) 651; Bonner v. Arden, (2d Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 703. But see Northwestern Yeast
Co. v. Broutin, (6th Cir. 1943) 133 F. (2d) 628, holding that each provision of the FI.SA
becomes a part of the employment contract of employees within the coverage of the act.
19 In 1949, the Wages and Hours Division inspected less than 5% of the establishments
covered by the act. S. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare on S. 653, 81st Cong., 1st sess., p. 72 (1949).
20 E.g., Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, Railway Employees Dept., A. F.
of L., 300 U.S. 515 (1937).
21 E.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
22Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
23 McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187 (1949).
24 The dissent in the principal case stated that a wrongfully discharged employee is
entitled to the same remedies as are provided for violation of the minimum wage and
overtime compensation provisions of the act. While there seems to be no real reason to
differentiate in the enforcement of the various provisions of the act, the language of the
statute seems clearly to preclude such uniform means of enforcement. Section 16 (b),
note 17 supra, gives an employee a right of action in his own name against "any employer
who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7 of the Act," which deal with minimum
wages and overtime compensation. Section 16 (c), note 12 supra, authorizes the Secretary
of Labor "to supervise the payment of unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime
compensation owing to any employees" under the same two sections, i.e., 6 and 7.

